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Receipt-Free Secure Elections
Daniel Ellard and David Alpert
Abstract
A fundamental requirement for secure and unco-
ercible elections is the receipt-free property; if vot-
ers cannot prove how they voted to anyone other
than themselves, then they cannot be coerced by a
second party to cast a particular vote.
We begin by describing a protocol for receipt-
free elections that was developed by Benaloh & Tu-
instra, and then show how this protocol, although
correct, is impractical to implement. We then show
how to modify this protocol to make it practical to
implement. Our protocol requires the addition of an
“uncoercible” third party who witnesses the execu-
tion of the protocol to make sure that it is executed
correctly, but who does not learn the value of the
vote.
1 Introduction
Secure elections have been the subject of much re-
search, but there still remain unsolved problems,
primarily in the areas of practicality and implemen-
tation. Our project focusses on the issue of receipt-
free and uncoercible elections.
For example, the protocol developed by Fujioka
et al [4], which is heralded as a practical algorithm,
is actually very difficult to implement in a conve-
nient manner, as Ben Adida et al discovered during
their implementation. Furthermore, this protocol
makes no provision for preventing the coercion of
voters, and we could not see how it could be patched
to add this desirable property.
The algorithm developed by Niemi & Renvall [8]
uses a very different approach, employing a multi-
party protocol, secret sharing, and multi-party com-
putation to achieve non-coercibility. It bases its se-
curity on the infeasibility of corrupting all of the
parties on the system– but in order for this to be
effective, there must be many parties in the system!
They admit in their conclusion that their protocol,
although promising and theoretically interesting, is
impractical.
Another approach to non-coercible votes is to use
the techniques developed to implement electronic
cash– in essence, each voter votes by “purchasing”
the kind of vote they desire. However, these ap-
proaches are complex and generally do not seem to
be well-suited to voting protocols– the desired prop-
erties of electronic cash are somewhat different than
the desired properties of electronic votes.
Other investigators [10] have sacrificed unco-
ercibility in their attempt to achieve practicality, but
we do not accept this tradeoff because the result-
ing protocols offer no important benefits over other
coercible voting protocols. Cramer et al [3] give a
protocol that shares many ideas with Niemi & Ren-
vall and Benaloh & Tuinstra, but does not achieve
non-coercibility.
We believe that the type of protocol created by
Benaloh & Tuinstra holds the most promise. How-
ever, the original statement of the protocol is im-
practical, and so we have modified it to make it prac-
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tical.
2 The Basic Protocol
Our basic protocol is based on the protocol devel-
oped by Benaloh & Tuinstra [2]. We selected this
protocol because of its relative simplicity and ele-
gance. Although this protocol has some flaws that
make it impractical to implement, we believe that
the principles that the protocol is based on hold the
promise of a practical and uncoercible voting proto-
col.
This section describes the basic protocol devel-
oped by Benaloh & Tuinstra, along with commen-
tary about the implementation difficulties presented
by each part of the protocol. Note that portions of
this section are excerpts of their paper [2], which
are reproduced here to introduce the notation that
we will use throughout the rest of the paper.
2.1 Terms and Definitions
• A voter is a party that should be permitted to
vote in the current election.
The Benaloh & Tuinstra protocol assumes that
the identity of the voter has already been au-
thenticated before the protocol begins, and
each message in the protocol from the voter to
any other party can be authenticated as coming
from the voter (via digital signatures, or any
other method). Because of the nature of the
protocol, an eavesdropper who is able to over-
hear every message that the voter sends will
still not be able to determine how the voter
voted. The voter cannot deny anything that
they say, but nevertheless can deny who they
voted for.
As we modify the protocol, we must either
make sure that this property still holds, or that
the voter is protected from coercion in some
other manner.
• The voting authority is a trusted party that is
responsible coordinating the voting and tally-
ing the votes of each of the voters.
The trust granted to the voting authority is not
complete– we do not necessarily trust that the
authority will follow the protocol, but in most
cases if the authority attempts to cheat, this will
be detected, with very high probability, by all
observers (including the voter) and the voting
protocol can be abandoned. (If the authority is
known to be trustworthy, then the protocol can
be extremely simplified.)
However, we do trust the authority in one very
important aspect– we trust that the authority
will never reveal anything of the information
contained in the secret message that it sends to
the voter, or partial tallys. If the authority it-
self can be coerced into revealing even a single
bit that would not otherwise be revealed by the
protocol, then the voter can be coerced.
Benaloh & Tuinstra assume that the authority
will not reveal any information not otherwise
revealed by the protocol (such as the contents
of any private messages or their private decryp-
tion key), and show that the protocol is secure
if this assumption is met. They also explore the
issue of how to distribute the responsibility of
the authority among several autonomous par-
ties in such a way that even if a subset of fewer
than half of the authorities reveals all their in-
formation, the vote is still secure.
– Let c = E(m) denote the probabilistic
public key encryption function using the
authority’s private key (which is known
only to the authority).
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It is essential that the encryption func-
tion be probabilistic (and therefore based
on a secure random number generator–
a difficult assumption in and of itself).
Since nearly all of the encryption is done
on one-bit votes (0 for no, 1 for yes), it
would be a grave error to use a determin-
istic encryption function– the known-text
attack on E would require only one en-
cryptions!
However, the reliance on probabilistic
protocols and the secrecy of the author-
ity combine to form a weakness in the
protocol– the authority can use the prob-
abilistic encryption as a covert channel.
The authority can repeatedly encrypt the
same value until the result contains a de-
sired bit pattern that communicates some
information about the encrypted mes-
sage. If done carefully, this kind of covert
channel can be extremely difficult to de-
tect.
– Let D(c) denote the decryption function
that inverts E(m), so that D(E(m)) ≡
m. The decryption function is only
known to the authority.
The Benaloh & Tuinstra protocol has a
weakness if the authority can be tricked
into decrypting arbitrary ciphertexts that
represent votes. However, we note that
all of the ciphertexts that are ever de-
crypted by the authority as part of this
protocol must also have been encrypted
by the authority. We must make sure that
any other messages decrypted by the au-
thority (for example, during the implied
by unstated authentication protocol) ei-
ther be encrypted using a different key,
or somehow be distinguishable from en-
crypted votes, so that this attack can not
be used to defeat the security of this pro-
tocol.
• Let N denote a security parameter, such that
any attempt by the authority to cheat will be
detected with probability P ≥ 1− ( 1
2
)N .
The complexity of the protocol, in terms of
computation and messages, isO(N), so there’s
no need to skimp on N . We can make the
probability of the authority successfully cheat-
ing vanishingly small without much additional
cost.
• The voting booth is a construction that the
voter can enter and leave. When inside the
voting booth, the voter can observe the out-
side world and receive messages. However,
the voter cannot be observed from outside the
booth; nothing that happens inside the booth
can be detected by anyone outside the booth
until the voter emerges from the booth.
Events that occur inside the booth cannot be
recorded in a time-stamped manner by the
voter. The voter could be coerced by taking
a tamperproof recording device into the booth
and use it to record everything they observe in
a time-stamped manner. Therefore, the voter
is prohibited from taking any recording device
into the booth.
The basic protocol is entirely reliant on these
properties of the booth. If the voter can smug-
gle a message out if the booth, or record a
true transcript of what they observe when in-
side the booth, then they can be coerced. This
is unquestionably a weakness of the protocol,
because it is a very difficult construction to
achieve.
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• The beacon is a trusted public source of ran-
dom bits.
2.2 The Election Protocol
2.2.1 Casting a Vote
1. Authority:
(a) Create N + 1 (0, 1) pairs.
(b) Encrypt each (0, 1) pair with E, creating
(x0, y0) · · · (xi, yi) · · · (xN , yN ) (where
each xi is the encryption of a 0 vote, and
each yi is the encryption of a 1 vote).
(c) Sort each of the (xi, yi) pairs, creat-
ing (α0, β0) · · · (αi, βi) · · · (αN , βN ),
such that αi = min(xi, yi), and
βi = max(xi, yi).
At this point, only the authority knows
whether each (αi, βi) is the encryption of
(0, 1) or (1, 0).
(d) The authority publishes the ordered list
(α0, β0) · · · (αi, βi) · · · (αN , βN ). Any
interested observer can obtain a copy, and
the voter must obtain a copy.
2. Voter: The vote enters the voting booth.
3. Authority: For each i ∈ 0 · · ·N , send ci =
D(αi) to the voter. This is done via a secure
channel; only the voter will be able to learn the
value of each ci directly from the authority.
At this point, the voter has an alleged decryp-
tion of each (αi, βi). However, they have no
proof that this decryption is correct; the au-
thority simply asserts that this is the correct de-
cryption but does not provide a complete proof
(or certificate) that shows that this is the correct
decryption.
4. Beacon: The beacon generates N bits
b1 · · · bN ∈R {0, 1}. The bits are witnessed
by all interested observers, including the voter
and the authority.
Note that the beacon only generates N bits,
and as a notational convenience the subscripts
of these bits begin at 1 instead of 0.
As an extension to the original protocol, we
suggest that if the beacon generates bi string
that is heavily biased towards one value (or in
the worst case, consists entirely of one value),
the protocol is restarted. Otherwise, the proba-
bility that the next step correctly catches a de-
vious authority is reduced.
5. Authority: for each bi generated by the bea-
con,
• If bi = 0, then publicly reveal D(αi) and
D(βi), including a complete proof that
these decryptions are correct.
To the general public, this decryption
shows that each decrypted pair of votes
were properly constructed; each con-
tained a single 0 and single 1 vote.
To the voter, this decryption also proves
that the authority was behaving correctly
in step 2.
• If bi = 1, then publicly connect (αi, βi)
to (α0, β0) by providing either:
– Proof that αi = α0 and βi = β0.
– Proof that αi = β0 and βi = α0.
This is done via a zero knowledge proof;
it is essential that these equalities are
proven without revealing the decryption
of α0 or β0. One method of doing this
requires an encryption scheme that has
properties described in section 2.2.4.
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To the general public, this connec-
tion shows that that each connection is
possible– either each (αi, βi) is a fraud-
ulent pair containing the same pair as
(α0, β0), or else each correctly contains
a (0, 1) pair (in some unknown order), as
does (α0, β0).
The probability that the authority can cre-
ate bogus (1, 1) or (0, 0) votes without
being detected is tiny, since the authority
must reveal approximately half the votes.
Unless the authority guesses every bi cor-
rectly (or has some way to compel the
beacon to act a particular way), it is very
unlikely that the authority will correctly
choose the single partition of the (α, β)
pairs that will allow him to successfully
cheat.
6. Voter: The voter casts their vote by publicly
announcing their choice of either α0 or β0
(based on which of these votes they believe
contains the encrypted form of the vote they
desire to cast).
2.2.2 Computing the Final Tally
Once all of the votes have been publicly announced,
the authority computes a final tally. This is accom-
plished by combining the votes directly in their en-
crypted form (without ever decrypting them), and
then presenting a decryption of the final result,
along with a proof that the decryption is correct. Ev-
ery witness can check the computation to make sure
that each vote was correctly included and that the
final result includes all correct votes (and no addi-
tional votes).
It is important that the authority not provide any
tallys other than the final, because otherwise care-
ful observers might be able to determine the value
of individual votes based on changes in the tally.
Since any observer can compute a pair of encrypted
tallys on their own that include and omit a particu-
lar voter, they will be able to prove how a particu-
lar voter voted if they can ever decrypt their tallys.
Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the author-
ity never decrypt anything that it didn’t encrypt (as
mentioned in section 2.1).
2.2.3 Uncoercibility
In this protocol, the voter cannot be coerced because
the voter cannot provide any irrefutable evidence
how that they voted. Their choice of α0 or β0 is
based entirely on their belief in the correctness of
the values of ci that are given to them by the au-
thority. However, as long as the authority does not
share the ci list with anyone else, then as soon as
the voter knows bi, he or she can create an alternate
cˆi list where cˆi = bi ⊕ ci. In this construction, cˆi
will be the same as ci for all of the votes that are
publicly opened, but the opposite for all of the votes
that are connected to (α0, β0). This allows the voter
to present evidence that their vote was the opposite
of their actual vote, and this evidence cannot be re-
futed by anyone except the authority.
However, this irrefutability property only exists
because of the voting booth– if the voter can tell
an outside party what ci is before anyone knows bi,
then they will not later be able to convincingly lie
about ci.
Interestingly, this non-coercion property extends
somewhat to the authority– as long as the voter can-
not tell anyone ci before knowing bi, the author-
ity can also forge a ci list that reverses the voter’s
vote, and can only be successfully challenged by
the voter. However, the authority can open any vote,
however, and therefore can be coerced.
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2.2.4 Appropriate Public Key Encryption
Schemes
Not every encryption scheme provides a method
to generate zero-knowledge proofs of equality (as
needed in the voting protocol) or a way to prove
the sum of the votes without revealing the individ-
ual votes. Benaloh & Tuinstra provide one, and cite
others.
The general property that these encryption
schemes must have is a homomorphism for addi-
tion and subtraction between the encrypted and de-
crypted values.
In particular, if c1 = E(m1) and c2 = E(M2),
then there must exist public, polynomial-time algo-
rithms to compute ⊗ and ⊘, which are defined to
be:
c1 ⊗ c2 = E(m1 +m2)
c1 ⊘ c2 = E(m1 −m2)
(Note– we follow Benaloh’s choice of notation
here, although we found it confusing.)
Note that there is one unlikely, but potential,
weakness here: to show that two ciphers c1 and
c2 represent the same value, we show that D(c1 ⊘
c2) = 0. Thus, in the process we have created
yet another public encryption of zero, which might
(with very small probability) collide with the value
of one of the other α or β values, and therefore com-
pletely reveal a vote.
3 Eliminating the Voting Booth
The voting booth is a huge obstacle to implementing
this protocol; even assuming that such a device can
be built, it is certainly impossible to implement it as
a program running on an ordinary computer. There-
fore, at best this protocol is impractical because it is
inconvenient– like current paper-ballot voting pro-
tocols, it requires the voters to travel to a special
site to vote, instead of voting from their homes or
offices. Therefore, it is imperative that we replace
the necessity of a voting booth with something fea-
sible.
Our approach to eliminating the need of the vot-
ing booth requires a second trusted party which is
used to coordinate the communication between the
voter and the authority. We call this new party the
listener because its role is primarily to listen to the
exchange of messages and make sure that the proto-
col is obeyed.
The tallying procedure is identical to the origi-
nal algorithm. A description of the modified vote-
casting protocol follows:
1. Step 1 proceeds as before; the authority creates
the (α, β) pairs and publishes them.
2. The authority uses a commitment scheme to
commit the values of ci to the listener via a pri-
vate channel. The authority does not reveal ci
to the listener, nor does the authority commu-
nicate at all with the voter.
3. The beacon generates N numbers bi ∈R
{0 · · · 3} (via flipping its coin twice per bi).
Note that we are introducing much more ran-
domness into this algorithm. The extra bits will
be used to “blind” the listener and prevent the
listener from ever learning the actual values of
ci.
4. The authority sends ci via a private channel to
the voter.
5. The voter uses the same bit-commitment
scheme to commit their copy of ci to the lis-
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tener over a private channel. The listener con-
firms that the commitments it has received
from the authority and from the voter are iden-
tical. If they are not identical, then the protocol
is aborted.
We assume the use of a deterministic commit-
ment scheme, so that if two bit strings B1 and
B2 are committed by an identical commitment,
then B1 ≡ B2. For example, we can use a se-
cure hash function to hash the bit string ci, and
use the resulting hash value as a commitment
to those bits. (We can also use a nondetermin-
istic schemes that ensure that B1 = B2 with
very high probability.)
6. The authority reveals information about each
(αi, βi) pair. If bi is 0 or 1, then the same pro-
tocol as described earlier applies. However, if
bi is 2 or 3, then the authority reveals no infor-
mation whatsoever about (αi, βi).
This overhead is necessary to prevent the lis-
tener from directly inferring the value of ci.
Based on the information available in the orig-
inal protocol, the listener can eliminate all pos-
sible ci strings except two– the real ci, and the
cˆi that the voter would forge in order to pretend
that they had cast the opposite vote. With only
two possibilities, the listener can easily con-
struct both, hash each, and see which matches
the commitment he received in the second step.
In this protocol, however, approximately half
of the ci bits are still completely unknown to
the listener. Therefore, the listener has many
possibilities to consider. By making N large
enough (and making sure that our hash func-
tion is computationally secure), we can easily
make it intractable for the listener to discover
ci via brute-force search, even when the search
is guided by the information revealed by the
authority.
7. The voter casts their vote, as before.
3.1 Uncoercibility
As before, the voter cannot reveal anything about
ci to a third party until after the beacon has gener-
ated bi, and therefore the voter can forge a cˆi that
is consistent with ci in all verifiable ways, but re-
verses their vote. Only the authority or the listener
can claim that cˆi is a forgery (and only the authority
can prove the forgery).
3.2 Trusting the Listener
The listener is able to determine whether or not the
authority and voter correctly share the ci string, but
cannot determine what the ci string is. Thus, we
do not need to worry that the listener will directly
reveal the value of c0.
However, the voter and the listener can collabo-
rate to produce a receipt for the voter’s vote– if the
listener reveals the commitment of ci before the bea-
con has generated bi, then the commitment of ci pins
down the voter. The voter cannot successfully forge
a list of ci values that is consistent with the public
information, consistent with the commitment, and
reverses their vote.
Therefore, the level of trust we must grant the
listener is somewhat below the authority. The au-
thority can reveal everything about a voter, includ-
ing how they voted, without the cooperation of the
voter. The listener, on the other other hand, requires
the collaboration of the voter in order to reveal any-
thing useful. We must trust that the listener will not
reveal the commitment of ci. There’s nothing else
that the listener knows, however, so there’s nothing
else that it can reveal.
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4 Open Issues
The voter can still be coerced in our protocol by be-
ing forced to show the decryption of messages sent
to the voter from the authority via their private chan-
nel. If an eavesdropper can capture a copy of these
messages, they can later compel the voter to decrypt
them and prove that the decryption is correct. If this
happens, the voter cannot deny the contents of the
message and therefore cannot conceal their vote.
One solution to this problem is to require that all
voting be done on a secure, trusted network– but
this makes the protocol inconvenient and impracti-
cal, since voters must vote from special sites instead
of voting from whatever computer they desire. Al-
though we have eliminated the need for the unreal-
istically secure voting booth, the need for physical
network security remains.
We see two possible solutions to this problem:
• Use a decryption method for each ci that allows
each bit to be decrypted in either manner. The
decryption step has two keys– a true key, which
the voter would ordinarily use, and a “duress”
key, which the voter could use to decrypt the
same bit to reveal the opposite value of the true
value.
Once the voter has revealed the decryption
of one ci, and proven the correctness of this
decryption (possibly by revealing one of the
keys), the dual of this key can never be used.
Therefore, each ci must be encrypted with a
different public key.
This method requires the generation of a huge
number of keys, but is otherwise practical, as-
suming that a feasible probabilistic encryption
algorithm with a duress key can be constructed.
We conjecture that it can be, although we have
not seen one.
• Use some other form of deniable communica-
tion, such as the deniable authentication proto-
col being developed by Michael Rabin.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a modification of the Benaloh &
Tuinstra protocol that increases the practicality of
the protocol to the point where secure implementa-
tions are possible.
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